
A 51% attack refers to the majority control over block production and the ability to rewrite transaction history on a blockchain.
This is a majority control risk in blockchain consensus mechanisms. If a single entity obtains more than half of the key resources on a chain—meaning over 50% of the network’s computational power in Proof of Work (PoW) or more than half of the staked assets in Proof of Stake (PoS)—it can dominate block production, alter the order of recent blocks, and reverse transactions that have been broadcast but are not yet final.
Here, “computational power” refers to mining capacity, while “stake” denotes the amount of tokens participating in consensus. Malicious rewriting of transactions may lead to double-spending, where the same asset is spent more than once.
51% attacks directly impact the security of funds and the overall credibility of a blockchain network.
For regular users, the most immediate effect is transaction rollbacks on exchanges—assets that appear deposited may be reversed, disrupting financial planning. Merchants may also see received payments canceled, resulting in losses.
For projects and broader blockchain ecosystems, frequent chain reorganizations can undermine trust among developers and institutions. Exchanges may raise confirmation requirements or suspend deposits and trading for affected tokens, leading to decreased liquidity and increased price volatility.
A 51% attack is executed by privately building a longer chain and then replacing the public chain.
In Proof of Stake, if a single party controls the majority stake, they can similarly dictate recent block order and finality. Although penalties (like slashing for malicious forks) reduce attack incentives, concentrated control remains a security risk.
Common signs include transaction reversals, abnormal chain reorganizations, and emergency platform responses.
On exchanges, deposits usually require a set number of confirmations. If abnormal reorganizations or concentrated block production are detected, platforms may temporarily increase confirmation requirements or suspend deposits/withdrawals to prevent double-spending. For example, Gate’s risk management increases confirmations for small PoW tokens upon reorg alerts and notifies users until stability returns.
Mining pools and block explorers may display “reorg” notices if recent blocks are replaced; sudden concentration of block production among few nodes is another red flag.
In DeFi scenarios, if a base layer blockchain undergoes reorganization, transaction order changes can disrupt loan liquidations, cross-chain bridge settlements, and protocol operations, possibly triggering emergency protection modes and freezing certain functions.
Protection requires coordinated efforts across networks, platforms, and users.
Large blockchains have become more secure in 2025, but smaller chains still face significant risks.
Over the past year, Bitcoin’s total network hashrate reached record highs (hundreds of EH/s in Q3), making attacks prohibitively expensive. In contrast, some small PoW chains operate at just tens to hundreds of TH/s; recent rental market data shows computational power can cost as little as $0.2–$0.5 per TH/s per hour. This means controlling a majority hashrate for one hour could cost under $10,000—posing real threats during periods of low liquidity.
Incident reports from 2024 show that most notable 51% attacks targeted low-cap PoW chains; this year, reported cases have decreased thanks to improved monitoring and response strategies by exchanges and mining pools. However, risks vary by token—users should monitor real-time mining pool dashboards and exchange announcements.
For Proof of Stake networks in 2025, security discussions focus on the “majority stake versus finality” dilemma: while majority stake can influence short-term block ordering, strong slashing penalties and social recovery mechanisms greatly increase the long-term cost of attacks. Recently, many chains have integrated extra security modules such as rapid finality and additional validation to minimize rollback windows.
The two attacks target different resources and have distinct goals.
A 51% attack relies on majority computational power or stake to rewrite recent ledger history at the consensus layer. A Sybil attack manipulates network propagation or voting by creating fake identities or controlling multiple nodes—it does not require substantial computational power or stake, focusing instead on identity-level manipulation.
Understanding this distinction helps choose appropriate defenses: for 51% attacks, enhance confirmations and decentralization; for Sybil attacks, introduce identity costs and reputation mechanisms.
Yes—smaller projects face higher risks because their computational power is more distributed and cheaper for attackers to control. In contrast, Bitcoin’s high concentration in large mining pools means an attack would cost billions of dollars—making it practically unfeasible. Projects can improve security by increasing node counts and optimizing consensus mechanisms.
The risk depends on attack type. Double-spending attacks can steal coins directly but rarely target individual wallets; chain reorganizations may reverse transactions or cause price drops. The best protection is to store assets on major exchanges like Gate rather than self-custody wallets since exchanges employ multi-layer verification mechanisms.
PoW systems are generally more susceptible—controlling 51% of computational power is all that’s needed to launch an attack. While PoS can theoretically be attacked if someone acquires over 50% stake, doing so is extremely costly and would drive up token prices. In practice, most recorded 51% attacks target small PoW coins; PoS projects see such incidents far less frequently.
Usually yes—the more confirmations a transaction has, the further it is from potential rollback. Six confirmations are often recommended for final settlement; for large amounts or smaller tokens, waiting for more may be prudent. Exchanges like Gate set sufficient confirmation thresholds to safeguard user assets.
Common approaches include: adopting hybrid consensus mechanisms (e.g., PoW+PoS) to raise attack costs; increasing node counts to distribute computational power; implementing checkpointing to prevent long-range attacks; adjusting difficulty more frequently to make attacks harder to sustain; forming emergency response teams to monitor unusual hashrate shifts and issue timely alerts.


