As the storage layer solution for the Sui ecosystem, Walrus's tight technical coupling means its stability depends not only on its own distributed node network but also directly on the operational status of the Sui mainnet.
We need to seriously consider a realistic extreme scenario: what happens if the Sui network halts due to a consensus mechanism vulnerability or a large-scale DDoS attack?
During the downtime of the Sui mainnet, although Walrus's storage nodes are still running and the hard drive data remains intact, the central control system of the entire system loses responsiveness. You cannot apply for new storage quotas, cannot adjust access permission policies, and may even be unable to verify storage ownership and access rights through contracts on the Sui chain. The result is that data falls into a "zombie" state—physically present but logically inaccessible or uncontrollable.
What’s especially problematic are scenarios that rely on on-chain real-time verification for permission authentication. For example, applications that require "holding a specific NFT to decrypt stored files." Once Sui experiences a shutdown, the entire authentication mechanism collapses, and even users with legitimate permissions cannot access the data.
Based on this understanding, when designing high-availability business applications, I do not assume that L1 will always be stable and online. Instead, I would build a "backup fallback plan": cache key metadata and permission snapshots on the application side. When the Sui network encounters a failure, the application can temporarily switch to a local verification mode, directly requesting data from Walrus nodes using cached credentials—provided that Walrus nodes offer some form of offline verification capability or the application layer has alternative decryption methods.
In simple terms, without such an "off-chain fallback" contingency plan that allows basic operations to continue independently of the main chain, all decentralized storage solutions risk appearing fragile in the face of mainnet failures.
Disclaimer: The above reflects personal research opinions and is intended for technical discussion only; it does not constitute any investment advice.
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GasBandit
· 9h ago
It's the same old problem again, does a L1 failure cause Walrus to crash? Should have thought of this earlier.
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SybilSlayer
· 23h ago
Another paradox of "decentralized but inseparable from the main chain," hilarious
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It's really just using the guise of distribution to do centralized things. If Sui crashes, the entire Walrus is finished
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So no matter how good the words are, at critical moments, it still relies on caching and local verification as a fallback. Maybe I should just upload to IPFS directly
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This is what I've always wanted to ask: nodes are alive, data is alive, but permission verification is dead. Is this truly distributed or pseudo-distributed?
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Offline verification capability... Honestly, how many projects have really thought about this layer? Most are still shouting the slogan of decentralization
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It's clear the author has really thought about this issue. The backup fallback plan is a good idea, but in reality, who is willing to spend extra costs to implement this system?
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MetadataExplorer
· 23h ago
This is a typical dilemma of "looks decentralized but not truly decentralized." If Sui crashes, the data will be frozen alive.
It sounds like we're being advised to find ways to back up ourselves and not rely too much on on-chain verification.
This issue seems more serious than expected; many projects may not have even considered this scenario.
A truly decentralized storage solution should have offline fault tolerance capabilities, otherwise it's just a pipe dream.
The caching credential trick sounds a bit like treating the symptom rather than the root cause.
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GasWhisperer
· 23h ago
nah, the zombie state thing hits different... data exists but can't touch it lmao
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SwapWhisperer
· 23h ago
The data is still lying on the hard drive, but if the chain is dead, it can't be used. This is the true decentralization paradox.
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EthMaximalist
· 23h ago
It's the same old problem... If L1 crashes, Walrus becomes useless. Honestly, it's still a chain issue—no matter the storage layer, the main chain has to take the blame.
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SchrödingersNode
· 23h ago
It's the same coupling trap again; if L1 crashes, the entire ecosystem collapses.
That's why I never believe in the phrase "completely decentralized." In the end, it's still controlled by the main chain.
Having an offline backup plan is the right way; otherwise, storing more data is pointless.
As the storage layer solution for the Sui ecosystem, Walrus's tight technical coupling means its stability depends not only on its own distributed node network but also directly on the operational status of the Sui mainnet.
We need to seriously consider a realistic extreme scenario: what happens if the Sui network halts due to a consensus mechanism vulnerability or a large-scale DDoS attack?
During the downtime of the Sui mainnet, although Walrus's storage nodes are still running and the hard drive data remains intact, the central control system of the entire system loses responsiveness. You cannot apply for new storage quotas, cannot adjust access permission policies, and may even be unable to verify storage ownership and access rights through contracts on the Sui chain. The result is that data falls into a "zombie" state—physically present but logically inaccessible or uncontrollable.
What’s especially problematic are scenarios that rely on on-chain real-time verification for permission authentication. For example, applications that require "holding a specific NFT to decrypt stored files." Once Sui experiences a shutdown, the entire authentication mechanism collapses, and even users with legitimate permissions cannot access the data.
Based on this understanding, when designing high-availability business applications, I do not assume that L1 will always be stable and online. Instead, I would build a "backup fallback plan": cache key metadata and permission snapshots on the application side. When the Sui network encounters a failure, the application can temporarily switch to a local verification mode, directly requesting data from Walrus nodes using cached credentials—provided that Walrus nodes offer some form of offline verification capability or the application layer has alternative decryption methods.
In simple terms, without such an "off-chain fallback" contingency plan that allows basic operations to continue independently of the main chain, all decentralized storage solutions risk appearing fragile in the face of mainnet failures.
Disclaimer: The above reflects personal research opinions and is intended for technical discussion only; it does not constitute any investment advice.