deBridge Co-founder Warns Against Flow's Hasty Chain State Rollback Decision

In a recent post on X, Alex Smirnov, co-founder of deBridge, raised significant concerns about Flow’s decision to execute a hasty rollback of its blockchain state. While Flow’s management has publicly stated they are coordinating with key ecosystem participants including bridges, centralized exchanges, and decentralized exchanges, Smirnov highlighted a critical gap: deBridge, serving as one of Flow’s primary cross-chain infrastructure providers, has received no direct communication or coordination from the Flow team regarding this critical decision.

The Hidden Cost of Rushing Critical Infrastructure Decisions

The core issue centers on the economic and operational consequences of implementing such hasty corrective measures. Smirnov emphasized that the financial damage resulting from a precipitous state rollback could dwarf the original security incident, potentially cascading into systemic disruptions. These effects would reverberate through the entire ecosystem, impacting cross-chain bridges, custodial services, regular users, and counterparties who were conducting legitimate transactions during the affected time window.

Specific Technical Vulnerabilities in Cross-Chain Operations

The risks are particularly acute at the infrastructure level. Cross-chain transactions conducted during the rollback period face concrete hazards: asset balances could be artificially duplicated, transactions could become irreversible and permanently unrecoverable, and critical value transfers—such as USDC movements managed through LayerZero’s infrastructure—could be left in an indeterminate state. These aren’t theoretical concerns but practical failure modes that would directly harm participants across the ecosystem.

Learning from Industry Precedent: A Smarter Approach

Smirnov drew a strategic comparison to how BNB Chain handled comparable security emergencies. Rather than executing a comprehensive state reversal affecting all network activity, BNB Chain’s approach focused on surgical isolation of the attacker’s transactions and affected accounts. This targeted methodology prevented the cascading damage that comprehensive rollbacks inevitably trigger.

A Call for Measured Coordination and Transparency

Smirnov’s recommendation is explicit: Flow’s validators should temporarily suspend the rollback process until three conditions are met. First, a comprehensive remediation strategy must be established that addresses the security breach without creating secondary disasters. Second, genuine coordination with ecosystem participants must occur—not after-the-fact announcements but authentic dialogue with partners like deBridge. Third, established security organizations must be engaged to validate the approach.

The broader message transcends this specific incident: complex infrastructure decisions demand restraint, collaborative problem-solving, and transparency rather than rapid unilateral action. The immediate pressure to resolve a security crisis can produce solutions more damaging than the original problem.