Iran Accepting Crypto Payments for Weapons—But This May Not Help It Evade Sanctions

In brief

• The website for Iran’s Ministry of Defence Export Center (Mindex) has been updated to say that it would accept payment for military equipment in crypto.
• Iran has been a big adopter of crypto for the evasion of sanctions, but some experts suggest that the Mindex website may not facilitate that much trade using cryptocurrencies.
• While crypto may help provide alternative means of payment, experts also argue that it can make identification and designation of illicit flows more straightforward.

Iran has begun accepting crypto as payment in its sales of advanced weapons, as part of ongoing efforts to evade international sanctions. Mindex, Iran’s Ministry of Defence Export Center, has updated the FAQ on its website to state that accepted payment methods include “the cryptocurrency agreed upon in the contract.” Products for sale via Mindex include rockets, aircraft, tanks and boats, as well as guns, ammunition, data services, and communication equipment. Iran has been accused of supplying weapons to Russia in recent years, as well as to groups that have been designated as terrorist organizations by the United States (e.g. Hezbollah and the Houthis).

It has been sanctioned by the United States to varying degrees since 1979, while the United Kingdom, France and Germany renewed sanctions related to nuclear proliferation activities in August 2025. Iran’s apparent embrace of crypto was first reported by the Financial Times, which describes the move as the first example of a nation-state accepting cryptocurrency as payment for military goods and services. However, some security commentators are skeptical that Iran will receive significant sums of crypto via the Mindex website, which TRM Labs’ Ari Redbord suggests may have been mischaracterized as a transactional platform. Speaking to Decrypt, Redbord said that he wouldn’t agree with any claim that “a heavily sanctioned nation-state is openly marketing ballistic missiles, drones, warships, and other strategic systems through a public website—essentially an Amazon-style storefront for Iranian weapons.”

Any such claim raises red flags for Redbord, largely because website-based sales are “simply not how sovereign arms transfers” are generally carried out. Redbord has reviewed the Mindex website, and while he affirms that it does appear to be a legitimate state-linked marketing site, he highlights the lack of prices, quantities, delivery timelines and logistical details. “There is no shopping cart, checkout process, order confirmation, or integrated payment infrastructure,” he said. “There are no cryptocurrency wallets, public keys, smart contracts, or blockchain rails.” Redbord notes that there is no ‘buy’ option if you click on an item, with the only available action being to ‘Add to LOI.’  “Clicking that routed me to a Letter of Intent form requiring extensive self-identification: name, nationality, company affiliation, contact details, referral source, and references to approvals and security authorization,” he explained, adding that at no point was he shown a quote or a request for any kind of payment information. Rather than actively buying military hardware, he suggests that the site’s visitors would be submitting themselves for review, presumably by the Iran military and/or government. “Cryptocurrency does appear on the site, but only as one item in a list of possible settlement options alongside barter arrangements and other negotiated terms,” he added. “The language is consistently conditional, framed as ‘as agreed in the contract.’”

Ultimately, Redbord argues that Mindex functions as “a signaling and intake mechanism” rather than a “crypto-enabled” online retail site, especially given the fact that strategic arms transfers are usually protracted political acts involving licensing, end-user assurances, compliance reviews, logistics, training and long-term support. Iran and crypto While it may be questionable as to whether the Mindex site will now usher in a sudden increase in crypto-based business, there’s no doubt that Iran has been a relatively early adopter of crypto, and that it will continue to use crypto wherever possible. “Given the sanctions in Iran, cryptocurrency has become an alternative payment rail to facilitate cross border trade, as well as remittances,” said Andrew Fierman, the Head of National Security Intelligence at Chainalysis. Fierman told _Decrypt _that Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and their proxy networks have recently expanded their use of cryptocurrencies to facilitate money laundering, illicit oil sales and procurement of arms and commodities, with total (identified) volumes currently standing at over $2 billion. He explained, “Between Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis, these organizations are using cryptocurrency at scales previously not seen on the blockchain.” Yet despite Iran’s increasing use of crypto, Fierman also indicated that blockchain-based money laundering and sanctions evasion may provide opportunities for law enforcement. As an example, he highlighted OFAC’s designation last September of two Iranian individuals and a network of shell companies based in Hong Kong and the UAE. The designated parties had coordinated crypto transactions aimed at laundering the proceeds of around $100 million in oil sales, with funds ultimately being directed to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force (IRGC-QF) and Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL).

“The complexity of this network, spanning multiple jurisdictions and utilizing both traditional front companies and cryptocurrency, highlights the challenges in detecting and disrupting modern sanctions evasion schemes,” he said. “However, it also shows how the transparency of the blockchain presents unprecedented opportunities to identify and disrupt complex networks facilitating sanctions evasion in the hundreds of millions of dollars.”